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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the maturity composition and the term structure of interest rate spreads of
government debt in emerging markets. In the data, when interest rate spreads rise, debt maturity
shortens and the spread on short-term bonds is higher than on long-term bonds. To account for
this pattern, we build a dynamic model of international borrowing with endogenous default and
multiple maturities of debt. Short-term debt can deliver higher immediate consumption than long-
term debt; large long-term loans are not available because the borrower cannot commit to save in the
near future towards repayment in the far future. However, issuing long-term debt can insure against
the need to roll-over short-term debt at high interest rate spreads. The trade-oﬀ between these
two beneﬁts is quantitatively important for understanding the maturity composition in emerging
markets. When calibrated to data from Brazil, the model matches the dynamics in the maturity of
debt issuances and its comovement with the level of spreads across maturities.
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Emerging markets face recurrent and costly ﬁnancial crises that are characterized by limited
access to credit and high interest rates on foreign debt. As crises approach, not only is debt
limited but also the maturity of debt shortens, as documented by Broner, Lorenzoni, and
Schmukler (2007).1 During these periods, however, the interest rate spread on short-term
bonds rises more than the spread on long-term bonds. Why do countries shorten their debt
maturity during crises even though spreads appear higher for shorter maturity debt? To
answer this question, this paper develops a dynamic model of the maturity composition in
which debt prices reﬂect endogenous default risk and debt maturity responds to the prices
of short- and long-term debt contracts. Our model can rationalize shorter debt maturity
during crises as the result of a liquidity advantage in short-term debt contracts; although
these contracts carry higher spreads than longer term debt, they can deliver larger resources
to the country in times of high default risk.
We ﬁrst analyze the dynamics of the maturity composition of international bonds and the
term structure of interest rate spreads for four emerging market countries: Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, and Russia. We use data on prices and issuances of foreign-currency denominated
bonds to estimate spread curves — interest rate spreads over U.S. Treasury bonds across
maturity — as well as duration,am e a s u r eo ft h ea v e r a g et i m et om a t u r i t yo fp a y m e n t so n
coupon paying bonds. We ﬁnd that governments issue short-term debt more heavily when
spreads are high and spread curves are downward sloping, and they issue long-term debt
more heavily when spreads are low and spread curves are upward sloping. Across these four
countries, within periods in which 2-year spreads are below their 25th percentile, the average
duration of new debt is 7.1 years, and the average diﬀerence between the 10-year spread and
the 2-year spread is 2.3 percentage points. But when the 2-year spreads are above their 75th
percentile, the average duration shortens to 5.7 years, while the average diﬀerence between
the 10-year spread and the 2-year spread is −0.5 percentage points. From this evidence we
conclude that the maturity of debt shortens in times of high spreads and downward-sloping
spread curves.
We then develop a dynamic model with defaultable bonds to study the choice of debt
maturity and its covariation with the term structure of spreads. In our model, a risk averse
borrower faces persistent income shocks and can issue long and short duration bonds. The
b o r r o w e rc a nd e f a u l to nd e b ta ta n yp o i n ti nt i m e ,b u tf a c e sc o s t so fd o i n gs o . D e f a u l t
1Calvo and Mendoza (1996) document in detail how in Mexico during 1994, most of the public debt
was converted to 91-day Tesobonos. Bevilaqua and Garcia (2000) document a similar rise in short-term
government debt in Brazil during the 1999 crisis.
2occurs in equilibrium in low-income, high-debt times because the cost of coupon payments
outweighs the costs of default when consumption is low. Interest rate spreads on long and
short bonds compensate foreign lenders for the expected loss from future defaults. Thus, the
supply of credit is more stringent in times of low income and high outstanding debt, because
the probability of default is high. In fact, countercyclical default risk substantially limits
the degree of risk sharing, and the model can generate capital outﬂows in recessions, when
interest rate spreads are at their highest.
The model generates the observed dynamics of spread curves because the endogenous
probability of default is persistent, yet mean reverting, as a result of the dynamics of debt
and income. When debt is low and income is high, default is unlikely in the near future, so
spreads are low. However, long-terms spreads are higher than short-term spreads because
default may become likely in the far future if the borrower receives a sequence of bad shocks
and accumulates debt. On the other hand, when income is low and debt is high, default is
likely in the near future, so spreads are high. Long-term spreads, however, increase by less
than short-term spreads because the borrower’s likelihood of repaying may rise if it receives
a sequence of good shocks and reduces its debt. Although cumulative default probabilities
on long-term debt are always larger than on short-term debt, the long spread can be lower
than the short spread because it reﬂects a lower average future default probability.
The model can rationalize the covariation observed in the data between the maturity
structure of debt issuances and the term structure of spreads as reﬂe c t i n gat r a d e - o ﬀ between
insurance beneﬁts of long-term debt and liquidity beneﬁts of short-term debt, both due to
the presence of default. Long-term debt provides insurance against the uncertainty of short-
term interest rate spreads. Since short-term spreads rise during periods of low income, when
default risk is high, issuing long-term debt allows the borrower to avoid rolling over short-
term debt at high spreads in states when consumption is low. Moreover, long-term debt
insures against future periods of limited credit availability; in particular, the borrower can
avoid capital outﬂows in recessions by issuing long-term debt.
Even though long debt dominates short debt in terms of insurance, it is not as eﬀective in
delivering high immediate consumption; hence the liquidity beneﬁt of short-term debt. Short-
t e r md e b ta l l o w st h eb o r r o w e rt op l e d g em o r eo fh i sf u t u r ei n c o m et o w a r dd e b tr e p a y m e n t
because in each subsequent period the threat of default punishment gives him incentives for
repayment before any further short debt is issued. Long-term debt contracts do not allow
such large transfers because the borrower is unable to commit to saving in the near future
toward repayment in the further future. Eﬀectively, the threat of default punishment is lower
with long-term debt given that it will be relevant only in the future, when the long-term debt
3is due. This greater eﬃcacy of short-term debt in alleviating commitment problems for debt
repayment is reﬂected in more lenient price schedules and smaller drops in short-term prices
with increases in the level of debt issues. In this sense, short debt is a more liquid asset, and
consumption can always be marginally increased by more with short-term debt than with
long-term debt.
The time-varying maturity structure responds to a time-varying valuation of the insurance
beneﬁt of long-term debt and the liquidity beneﬁto fs h o r t - t e r md e b t .P e r i o d so fl o wd e f a u l t
probabilities and upward spread curves correspond to states when the borrower is wealthy
and values insurance. Thus, the portfolio is shifted toward long debt. Periods of high default
probabilities and inverted spread curves correspond to states when the borrower is poor and
credit is limited. These are times when liquidity is most valuable, and thus the portfolio
is shifted toward shorter-term debt. We can therefore rationalize higher short-term debt
positions in times of crises as an optimal response to the illiquidity of long-term debt, and
the tighter availability of its supply.
When calibrated to Brazilian data, the model quantitatively matches the dynamics of the
maturity composition of new debt issuances and its covariation with spreads observed in the
data. In connecting our model to the data, a methodological contribution of the paper is to
develop a tractable framework with bonds that have empirically relevant duration. Bonds in
our model are perpetuity contracts with non-state-contingent coupon payments that decay
at diﬀerent rates. Bonds with payments that decay quickly have more of their value paid
early, and so have short duration. This gives a recursive structure to debt accumulation that
allows the model to be characterized in terms of a small number of state variables although
decisions at any date are contingent on a long sequence of future expected payments. Our
ﬁndings indicate that the insurance beneﬁts of long-term debt and the liquidity beneﬁts of
short-term debt are quantitatively important in understanding the dynamics of the maturity
structure observed in Brazil. Importantly, the maturity structure in the model responds to
the underlying dynamics of default probabilities reﬂected in spread curves, which match the
data well.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on the optimal maturity structure of government debt.
Angeletos (2002), Buera and Nicolini (2004) and Shin (2007) show that, when debt is not
state contingent, a rich maturity structure of government bonds can be used to replicate
the allocations obtained with state-contingent debt in economies with distortionary taxes as
in Lucas and Stokey (1983). In these closed economy models, short- and long-term interest
4rate dynamics reﬂect the variation in the representative agent’s marginal rate of substitution,
which changes with the state of the economy. Thus, having a rich enough maturity structure
is equivalent to having assets with state-contingent payoﬀs.2 Our paper shares with these
papers the message that managing the maturity composition of debt can provide beneﬁts to
the government because of uncertainty over future interest rates. The message is particularly
relevant for the case of emerging market economies. As Neumeyer and Perri (2005) have
shown, ﬂuctuations in country speciﬁc interest rate spreads play a major role in accounting
for the large business cycle ﬂuctuations in emerging markets. The lesson that our paper
provides in this context is that the volatility of the maturity composition of debt in these
countries is an optimal response to these interest rate ﬂuctuations. However, in contrast
to these papers, the ﬂuctuations in interest rates in our model reﬂect time variation in the
endogenous country’s own probability of default.3
The maturity of debt in emerging countries is also of interest because of the general
view that countries could alleviate their vulnerability to very costly crises by choosing the
appropriate maturity structure. For example, Cole and Kehoe (1996) argue that the 1994
Mexican debt crisis could have been avoided if the maturity of government debt had been
longer. Longer maturity debt would allow countries to better manage external shocks and
sudden stops. Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2007) formalize this idea in a model where
the government can avoid a crisis in the short term by issuing long-term debt. In their model,
with risk averse lenders who face liquidity shocks, long-term debt is more expensive, so the
maturity composition is the result of a trade-oﬀ between safer long-term debt and cheaper
short-term debt. In line with their paper, we also ﬁnd that short-term debt provides larger
liquidity beneﬁts. In contrast to Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler, in our model the time-
varying availability of short- and long-term debt is an equilibrium response to compensate for
the economy’s default risk, rather than to compensate for foreign lenders’ shocks. Moreover,
our paper is the ﬁrst to develop a dynamic framework with defaultable debt and multiple
maturities with which these questions can be analyzed and assessed quantitatively.
The larger liquidity beneﬁts of short-term debt relative to long-term debt arise in our
model because short-term contracts are more eﬀective in solving the commitment problem of
the borrower in terms of future debt and default policies. In this regard, our paper is related
to Jeanne’s (2004) model where short-term debt gives more incentives for the government
2Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin (2006) develop a general equilibrium model with uninsurable nominal frictions
to study the optimal maturity of government debt. They ﬁnd that higher interest rates on long-term debt
relative to short-term debt reﬂect an insurance premium paid by the government, for the beneﬁts long-term
debt provides in hedging against future shocks.
3The idea that credit risk makes longer term debt attractive is also present in Diamond (1991) in a three
period model of corporate debt where ﬁrms have private information about their future credit rating.
5to implement better policies. When short-term debt needs to be rolled over, creditors can
discipline the government by rolling over the debt only after desired policies are implemented.4
Moreover, when defaulted debt is renegotiated, Bi (2007) shows that long-term debt is more
expensive also to compensate for debt dilution. Absent explicit seniority clauses, issuing
short-term debt can dilute the recovery of long-term debt in case of default.
The theoretical model in this paper builds on the work of Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and
Arellano (2008), who model equilibrium default with incomplete markets, as in the seminal
paper on sovereign debt by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). This paper extends this framework
to incorporate long debt of multiple maturities. In recent work, Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2008) and Hatchondo and Martinez (2008) show that long-term defaultable debt allows a
better ﬁt of emerging market data in terms of the volatility and mean of the country spread
as well as debt levels. All these models generate a time-varying probability of default that is
linked to the dynamics of debt and income. The dynamics of the spread curve in our model
reﬂect the time-varying default probability, in the same way that Merton (1974) derived for
credit spread curves on defaultable corporate bonds. In Merton’s model, when the exogenous
default probability is low, the credit spread curve is upward sloping, and when the default
probability is high, credit spread curves are downward sloping or hump shaped. The spread
curve dynamics in this paper follow Merton’s results. However, our framework diﬀers from
Merton’s in that the probability of default and the level and maturity composition of debt
issuances are endogenous variables.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 documents the dynamics of the spread
curve and maturity composition for four emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and
Russia. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 presents some examples to
illustrate the mechanism for the optimal debt portfolio. Section 5 presents all the quantitative
results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Emerging Markets Bond Data
We examine data on sovereign bonds issued in international ﬁnancial markets by four emerging-
market countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Russia. We look at the behavior of the
interest rate spreads over default-free bonds, across diﬀerent maturities, and at the way the
maturity of new debt issued covaries with spreads. We ﬁnd that when spreads are low, govern-
ments issue long-term bonds more heavily and long-term spreads are higher than short-term
4Commitment problems have been shown to reduce the level of sustainable debt in the literature of
optimal policy without commitment, as in Krusell, Martin, and Rios-Rull (2006).
6spreads. When spreads rise, the maturity of bond issuances shortens and short-term spreads
are higher than long-term spreads. Our ﬁndings also conﬁrm the earlier results of Broner,
Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2007), who showed in a sample of eight emerging economies that
debt maturity shortens when spreads are very high.5
2.1 Spread Curves
We deﬁne the n-year spread for an emerging market country as the diﬀerence between the
yield on a defaultable, zero-coupon bond maturing in n years issued by the country and on
a zero-coupon bond of the same maturity with negligible default risk (for example, a U.S.
Treasury note). The spread is the implicit interest rate premium required by investors to
be willing to purchase a defaultable bond of a given maturity.6 The spread curve depicts
spreads as a function of maturity.
We denote the annually compounded yield at date t on a zero-coupon bond issued by
country i,m a t u r i n gi nn years, as rn
t,i. The yield is related to the price pn
t,i of an n-year







We deﬁne country i’s n-year spread as the diﬀerence in zero-coupon yields between a
bond issued by country i relative to a default-free bond. The n-year spread for country i at
date t is given by: sn
t,i = rn
t,i − rn
t,rf,w h e r ern
t,rf is the yield of a n-year default-free bond.7
Since governments do not issue zero-coupon bonds in a wide range of maturities, we
estimate a country’s spread curve by using secondary market data on the prices at which
coupon-bearing bonds trade. The estimation procedure, described in the Appendix, follows
Svensson (1994) and Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2007).
We compute spreads starting in March 1996 at the earliest and ending in May 2004 at the
latest, depending on the availability of data for each country. Figure 1 displays the estimated
spreads for 2-year and 10-year bonds for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Russia.
5Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2007) focus on the relationship between the term structure of risk
premia (compensation for risk aversion) and the average maturity of debt. In this section we construct
measures of the term structure of yield spreads and the average duration of debt because these statistics
provide the basis for the quantitative assessment of our model.
6Yield spreads on bonds issued by emerging markets could also arise due to risk premia or liquidity
diﬀerences. However, given the incidence of sovereign defaults in emerging markets, in our model we abstract
from these other factors and examine the extent to which default risk can rationalize these spread dynamics.
7Our data include bonds denominated in U.S. dollars and European currencies, so we take U.S. and
Euro-area government bond yields as default-free.




















































































Figure 1: Time series of 2-year and 10-year spreads.
Spreads are very volatile, and the diﬀerence between long-term and short-term spreads
varies substantially over time. When spreads are low, long-term spreads are generally higher
than short-term spreads. However, when the level of spreads rises, the gap between long and
short-term spreads tends to narrow and sometimes reverses; the spread curve is ﬂatter or
inverted. The time series in Figure 1 show sharp increases in interest rate spreads associated
with Russia’s default in 1998, Argentina’s default in 2001, and Brazil’s ﬁnancial crisis in
2002.8 The expectation that the countries would default in these episodes is reﬂe c t e di nt h e
high spreads charged on defaultable bonds.
To emphasize the pattern observed in the time series that short-term spreads tend to rise
more than long-term spreads, in Figure 2 we display spread curves averaged across diﬀerent
8For Argentina and Russia, we do not report spreads after default on external debt, unless a restructuring
agreement was largely completed at a later date. We use dates taken from Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2005). For Argentina, we report spreads until the last week of December 2001, when the country defaulted.
The restructuring agreement for external debt was not oﬀered until 2005. For Russia, we report spreads until
the second week of August 1998 and beginning again after August 2000 when 75% of external debt had been
restructured.
8time periods for each country: the overall average, the average within periods with the 2-year
spread below its 10th percentile, and the average within periods with the 2-year spread above
its 90th percentile. When spreads are low, the spread curve is upward sloping: long-term
spreads are higher than short-term spreads. When spreads are high, short-term spreads rise
more than long-term spreads. For Argentina, Brazil, and Russia, the spread curve becomes
downward sloping in these times. For Mexico, which had relatively smaller increases in
spreads during this time period, the spread curve ﬂattens as short spreads rise more than
long spreads.9
2.2 The Maturity Composition of Debt and Spreads
We now examine the maturity of new debt issued by the four emerging market economies
during the sample period, and relate the changes in the maturity of debt to changes in
spreads.10
In each week in the sample, we measure the maturity of debt as a quantity-weighted
average maturity of bonds issued that week. We measure the maturity of a bond using two
alternative statistics. The ﬁrst is simply the number of years from the issue date until the
maturity date. The second is the bond’s duration,d e ﬁned in Macaulay (1938) as a weighted
average of the number of years until each of the bond’s future payments. A bond issued at
date t by country i,p a y i n ga n n u a lc o u p o nc at dates n1,n 2,...n J years into the future, and
















where pt,i (c) is the coupon bond’s price, and rn
t,i is the zero-coupon yield curve. The time
until each future payment is weighted by the discounted value of that payment relative to the
price of the bond. A zero-coupon bond has duration equal to the number of years until its
maturity date, but a coupon-paying bond maturing on the same date has shorter duration.
We consider duration as a measure of maturity because it is more comparable across bonds
9The ﬁndings are similar to empirical ﬁndings on spread curves in corporate debt markets. Sarig and
Warga (1989), for example, ﬁnd that highly rated corporate bonds have low levels of spreads, and spread
curves that are ﬂat or upward-sloping, while low-grade corporate bonds have high levels of spreads, and
average spread curves that are hump-shaped or downward-sloping.
10In addition to external bond debt, emerging countries also have debt obligations with multilateral
institutions and foreign banks. However, marketable debt constitutes a large fraction of the external debt.
The average marketable debt from 1996 to 2004 is 56% of total external debt in Argentina, 59% in Brazil,
and 58% in Mexico (Cowan et al. 2006).

















































































Figure 2: Average spread curves: overall, and within periods in the highest and lowest deciles
of the 2-year spread.
with diﬀerent coupon rates.
We calculate the average maturity and average duration of new bonds issued in each
week by each country. Table 1 displays each country’s averages of these weekly maturity
and duration series within periods of high (above median) and low (below median) 2-year
spreads.
First, the table shows that duration tends to be much shorter than maturity. Because the
yield on an emerging market bond is typically high, the principal payment at the maturity
date is severely discounted, and much of the bond’s value comes from coupon payments made
sooner in the future. This weight on coupon payments shortens the duration measure relative
10Table 1: Average Maturity and Duration of New Debt
Maturity (years) Duration (years)
2-year spread: < median ≥ median < median ≥ median
Argentina 9.15 9.05 5.70 5.10
Brazil 14.02 6.60 6.59 4.47
Mexico 13.50 10.30 7.72 6.52
Russia 8.89 10.98 6.11 5.42
to the time-to-maturity measure.
Second, the average duration of debt is shorter when spreads are high than when they are
low. Mexico, for example, issues debt that averages about 1.2 years longer in duration when
the 2-year spread is below its median than when it is above its median. For all countries
except Russia, this pattern also holds for the average time-to-maturity of bonds issued during
periods of high spreads compared to low spreads: Mexico issues bonds that mature 3.2 years
sooner when spreads are high. Our unconditional point estimates for a shorter debt duration
when spreads are high mirrors the ﬁndings in Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2007). They
show that a high spread level is a statistically signiﬁcant determinant for a shorter maturity
of debt issuances even after controlling for selection eﬀects due the fact that the timing of
debt issuances is very irregular.
I nT a b l e2 ,w ee m p h a s i z et h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h es p r e a dc u r v eslopes and average
duration. The slope of the spread curve, deﬁned here as the diﬀerence between the 10-year
(long-term) and 2-year (short-term) spread, falls when the 2-year spread is high — the numbers
in column 4 of Table 2 are smaller than those in column 3. During these times, however,
the countries shift toward short-term debt, even though the spreads on long-term debt rise
less than for short-term debt. In Brazil, for example, while the spread curve changes from
depicting a 10-year spread that is 4 percentage points above the 2-year spread to one that
is 1.33 percentage points below the 2-year spread, the average duration of newly issued debt
reduces by more than 2 years.
The message of this section is that the spread curve and the maturity of bond issuances
in emerging markets are time-varying. In particular, the slope of the spread curve covaries
positively with the maturity of new debt, and negatively with the levels of spreads: when
short-term spreads are low, the slope of the spread curve is higher, and the maturity of new
debt is longer, than when short-term spreads are high. In what follows, we build a dynamic
11Table 2: Slope of Spread Curve and Average Duration of Issuances
Duration (years) Spread curve slope (%)
s10 − s2
short spread: < 25th pct ≥ 75th pct < 25th pct ≥ 75th pct
Argentina 6.40 5.64 2.47 -1.16
Brazil 6.80 4.63 4.01 -1.33
Mexico 8.45 6.39 2.30 1.24
R u s s i a 6 . 5 76 . 1 90 . 5 7- 0 . 6 7
model that rationalizes this pattern, in which spreads reﬂect the government’s likelihood of
defaulting, and the average maturity of new debt endogenously varies over time.
3 The Model
Consider a dynamic model of defaultable debt that includes bonds of short and long duration.
A small open economy receives a stochastic stream of output, y, of a tradable good. The
output shock follows a Markov process with compact support and transition function f(y0,y).
The economy trades two bonds of diﬀerent duration with international lenders. Financial
contracts are unenforceable: the economy can default on its debt at any time. If the economy
defaults, it temporarily loses access to international ﬁnancial markets and also incurs direct
output costs.
The representative agent in the small open economy (henceforth, the “borrower”) receives






where 0 <β<1 is the time discount factor and u(·) is increasing and concave.
The borrower issues debt in the form of two types of perpetuity contracts with coupon
payments that decay geometrically. We let {δS,δL} ∈ [0,1] denote the “decay factors” of the
payments for the two bonds. A perpetuity with decay factor δm is a contract that speciﬁes
ap r i c eqm
t and a loan face value  m
t such that the borrower receives qm
t  m
t u n i t so fg o o d si n
period t and promises to pay, conditional on not defaulting, δ
n−1
m  m
t u n i t so fg o o d si ne v e r y
12future period t + n. The decay of each perpetuity is related to its duration: a bond of
this type with rapidly declining payments has a larger proportion of its value paid early on,
and therefore a shorter duration, than a bond with more slowly declining payments. We let
δS <δ L,s ot h a tδS is the decay of the perpetuity with short duration and δL is the decay
of the perpetuity with long duration. We will refer to the perpetuities with decay factors δS
and δL throughout as short and long bonds, respectively.
At every time t the economy has outstanding all past perpetuity issuances. Deﬁne bm
t ,
the stock of perpetuities of duration m at time t, as the total payments due in period t on
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0 is given. Thus, the accumulation for the stocks of short and long perpetuities can
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With these deﬁnitions, we can compactly write the borrower’s budget constraint condi-
tional on not defaulting. Purchases of consumption are constrained by the endowment less
payments on outstanding debt, bS
t +bL
t , plus the issues of new perpetuities of short duration
 S
t at price qS
t and long duration  L
t at a price qL
t :













The borrower chooses new issuances of perpetuities from a menu of contracts where prices
qS
t and qL
t for are quoted for each pair (bS
t+1,b L
t+1).
If the economy defaults, we assume that all outstanding debts and assets (bS
t + bL
t ) are
erased from the budget constraint, and the economy cannot borrow or save, so that con-






t = h(yt) ≤ yt.
133.1 Recursive Problem
We now represent the borrower’s inﬁnite horizon decision problem as a recursive dynamic
programming problem. The model has two endogenous states, which are the stocks of each
type of debt, bS
t and bL
t , and one exogenous state, the output of the economy, yt. The state
of the economy at date t is then given by (bS,b L,y) ≡ (bS
t ,b L
t ,y t).
At any given state, the value of the option to default is given by
v








where vc(bS,b L,y) is the value associated with not defaulting and staying in the contract and
vd(y) is the value associated with default.
Since we assume that default costs are incurred whenever the borrower fails to repay its
obligations in full, the model will only generate complete default on all outstanding debt, both
short and long term. When the borrower defaults, output falls to ydef, and the economy is
temporarily in ﬁnancial autarky; θ is the probability that it will regain access to international
















We are taking a simple route to model both costs of default that seem empirically relevant:
exclusion from ﬁnancial markets and direct costs in output. Moreover, we assume that the
default value does not depend on the maturity composition of debt prior to default. This
captures the idea that the maturity composition of defaulted debt is not relevant for the
restructuring procedures that allow the economy to reenter the credit market.11
When the borrower chooses to remain in the contract, the value is the following:
v
































L,b S,b L,y) 
0
L = y − bS − bL (9)
11This is consistent with empirical evidence regarding actual restructuring processes, where the maturity
composition of the new debt obligations is part of the restructuring agreement (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
2005).
14and to the laws of motion for the stock of perpetuities of short and long duration:
b
0
S = δSbS +  S
b
0
L = δLbL +  L.
The borrower decides on optimal debt levels b0
S and b0
L to maximize utility. The borrower
takes as given that each contract {b0
S,b 0
L} ∈ B comes with speciﬁc prices {qS,qL} that
are contingent on today’s states (bS,b L,y). The decision of whether to remain in the credit
contract or default is a period-by-period decision, so that the expected value from next period
forward in (8) incorporates the option to default in the future.
The default policy can be characterized by default sets and repayment sets. Let the
repayment set, R(bS,b L), be the set of output levels for which repayment is optimal when
short- and long-term debt are (bS,b L):
R(bS,b L)=
©
y ∈ Y : v
c(bS,b L,y) ≥ v
d(y)
ª
,( 1 0 )
and let the complement, the default set D(bS,b L), be the set of output levels for which default
is optimal for debt positions (bS,b L):
D(bS,b L)=
©





When the borrower does not default, optimal new debt takes the form of two decision
rules mapping today’s state into tomorrow’s debt levels:
b
0
S = ˜ bS(bS,b L,y) (12)
b
0
L = ˜ bL(bS,b L,y)
Given this characterization of debt and default decisions, we can now deﬁne the equilib-
rium bond prices at which lenders are willing to oﬀer contracts.
3.2 Bond Prices, Spreads, and Duration
Lenders are risk neutral and have an opportunity cost of funds equal to the risk-free rate r.
Lenders are therefore willing to purchase a defaultable bond at a price equal to the expected
discounted value of payments received from the bond. Each new issue of debt  S
t > 0 or
 L
t > 0 b yt h eb o r r o w e ri sap r o m i s et op a yac o u p o np a y m e n te v e r yp e r i o di nt h ef u t u r e ,
conditional on not defaulting up to that period. The price of a new debt issue, then, is the
15sum of the value of these coupon payments, each discounted by the risk-free rate and the
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f (yt+n,y t+n−1)···f (yt+1,y t)dyt+n ···dyt+1 (13)
for m = {S,L}. In each element of the sum on the right-hand side, the term δ
n−1
m corresponds
t ot h ec o u p o nr a t ed u ei np e r i o dt + n; (1 + r)−n is the lender’s n-period discount factor;
and the term under the integral calculates the probability that the borrower receives output
shocks that are in the repayment set each period up to t + n —t h a ti s ,t h eb o r r o w e rr e p a y s




t+1) f (yt+1,y t)dyt+1 =1for all t,







Note that the price qm
t of new debt issuances depends on current output, yt,a si ti n ﬂuences
expectations of future output realizations which determine future default decisions. The price






n=0, since the outstanding
debt in any period determines the decision to default, given the output shock. However, we
can transform the inﬁnite sum in (13) into a recursive expression for qm
t by assuming that
the lender forecasts the future debt levels using the borrower’s own decision rules for debt,
deﬁn e di n( 1 2 ) ,w h i c ha r ef u n c t i o n so n l yo ft h edebt choice next period. The sum in (13) can
































































































16If at any state (y,bS,b L) the borrower chooses to save,  S < 0 or  L < 0 , the contract
constitutes a promise from the lender to the borrower to pay thereafter the coupon payment.
We assume that savings rates for the borrower are risk-free, so that the eﬀective prices the































We are modeling savings contracts as risk-free because they seem the most empirically rel-
evant for emerging markets where savings are generally done at the international interest
rates (generally with T-bills), yet borrowing contracts compensate investors for default. Ad-
ditionally for computational convenience we are assuming that after default any savings that
the government has in international ﬁnancial markets are dissipated.12,13
We deﬁne the yield-to-maturity on each bond as in the data, as the implicit constant
interest rate at which the discounted value of the bond’s coupons equal its price. That is,













qS + δS − 1 and r
L =
1
qL + δL − 1.




S − r and s
L = r
L − r.
As output and debt change, the period-by-period probability of default varies over time,
12Ideally, one could have a model with four endogenous state variables, two for short- and long-term debt
issuances and two for short- and long term savings. However this speciﬁcation is computationally unfeasible.
Thus, under the assumption that after default any savings that the government has in international ﬁnancial
markets are dissipated, we can maintain risk-free savings and defaultable short- and long-term debt with only
two endogenous states.
13We could alternatively assume that savings contracts also carry the defaultable price, i.e. interest rates
on savings are higher than the risk-free rate. Results are similar with this alternative speciﬁcation. However,
by having savings contracts being risk-free, we avoid having cases that seem empirically implausible where
the government borrows large long-term loans just to increase its default probability and be able to save at
excessively high interest rates.
17and therefore the prices of long-term and short-term debt diﬀer, since they each put diﬀerent
weights on repayment probabilities in the future, as seen in (13). Spreads on short-term
and long-term bonds therefore generally diﬀer, and the relationship between the two spreads
changes over time, so that the spread curve is time-varying.
Finally, we deﬁne as in the data, the duration of debt issued at each date as the weighted
average of the time until each coupon payment, with the weights determined by the fraction














(1 + rS − δS)
and dL =
1+rL
(1 + rL − δL)
. (18)










We now deﬁne equilibrium. A recursive equilibrium for this economy is (i) a set of policy
functions for consumption ˜ c(bS,b L,y), new issuances for short-term debt ˜  S(bS,b L,y) and
long-term debt ˜  L(bS,b L,y), perpetuity stocks for short-term debt ˜ bS(bS,b L,y) and long-term
debt ˜ bL(bS,b L,y), repayment sets R(bS,b L), and default sets D(bS,b L), and (ii) price functions
for short debt qS (b0
S,b 0
L,b S,b L,y) and long debt qL (b0
S,b 0
L,b S,b L,y), such that:
1. Taking as given the bond price functions qS (b0
S,b 0
L,b S,b L,y) and qL(b0
S,b 0
L,b S,b L,y),
the policy functions ˜ bS(bS,b L,y), ˜ bL(bS,b L,y), ˜  S(bS,b L,y), ˜  L(bS,b L,y) and ˜ c(bS,b L,y),
repayment sets R(bS,b L), and default sets D(bS,b L) satisfy the borrower’s optimization
problem.
2. The bond price functions qS (b0
S,b 0
L,b S,b L,y) and qL(b0
S,b 0
L,b S,b L,y) reﬂect the bor-
rower’s default probabilities and lenders break even in expected value: equations (14),
(15), (16), and (17) hold.
184 Default and Optimal Maturity
In this section we illustrate the mechanisms that determine the optimal maturity composition
of debt in two simpliﬁed example economies. We view the borrower’s choice as a portfolio
allocation problem, in which the beneﬁts and costs of short-term and long-term debt deter-
mine the relative amounts of each type issued. In the ﬁrst example, we show that, in the
presence of lack of commitment in future debt and default policies, short-term debt is more
eﬀective than long-term debt in transferring future resources to the present. If the borrower
would try to borrow a lot of long-term debt, its price would fall to zero faster than if instead
the large loan would be short-term; hence, short-term debt is beneﬁcial for liquidity. In the
second example, we show that long-term debt allows the borrower to avoid the risk of rolling
over short-term debt at prices that diﬀer across future states due to diﬀerences in default
risk; hence, long-term debt provides insurance.
We construct the simplest possible examples to illustrate the mechanisms clearly. The
economy lasts for three periods. In period 0, income equals zero, and in periods 1 and 2
income is stochastic (with details to be speciﬁed in each example). The borrower can default
at any time, in which case consumption from then on is equal to ydef.
In each example, we compare the allocation with only one maturity of debt — one- or
two-period bonds — against the allocation with both maturities of debt.14 In each economy,
with both maturities available, in period 0 the borrower can issue one- and two-period bonds
b1
0 and b2
























In period 1, conditional on not defaulting, new short bonds b1
1 are issued given price schedule
q1
1(b1
1). Consumption is equal to income plus net debt:









In period 2, conditional on not defaulting, the borrower pays oﬀ long- and short-term debt,
and consumption equals income minus the repayment:









In the cases with only one type of debt available, the budget constraints are modiﬁed accord-
14It is straightforward to extend these examples for the case where long bonds pay a coupon in period 1
in addition to the payment in period 2, as long as y1 and y2 are suﬃciently diﬀerent.
19ingly.
The risk neutral lenders discount time at rate r and oﬀer debt contracts that compensate
them for the risk of default and give them zero expected proﬁts.
4.1 Example 1: Short-Term Debt Provides Liquidity
For this example we consider the following income process. Income in period 0 is equal to
0. Income in period 1 is equal to y. Income in period 2 can take 2 values, yH or yL with
yH >y L =0 , and the probability of yH is equal to g with 0 <g<1. Also, consumption
in default, ydef, is equal to 0. To abstract from any insurance properties of debt, we assume
that preferences are linear in consumption and given by
U = E[c0 + βc1 + β
2c2].
We assume that the borrower likes to front-load consumption, while lenders do not discount
the future: β< 1
1+r =1 , and we impose that consumption must be non-negative: ct ≥ 0 for
t =0 ,1, and 2.
4.1.1 Only Two-Period Bonds
First, consider the borrower’s problem when only two-period bonds are available in period
0, and one-period bonds are available in period 1. Under the assumption that β<(gyH −
yL)/(yH − yL), the solution to the borrower’s problem is the following. In period 2, the
borrower defaults when income equals yL. In period 0, the borrower borrows against all his














Although the borrower does not have preferences for smoothing consumption over time,
and would prefer to consume everything up front, it is not possible to consume everything in
period 0, because none of the income in period 1 can be borrowed against using two-period
debt. This is because such a contract would require a two-period loan with face value larger
than yH, so that the borrower would have to save part of the period 1 income to repay the
loan in period 2. Since the borrower cannot commit to this policy in period 0, however, the
20optimal choice in period 1 would be not to save, and then to default in period 2 regardless of
the level of income. That is, a debt contract that oﬀered q2
0b2
0 = a+gyH,f o ra n ya>0,i sn o t
possible, because the probability of default on the loan would be equal to one, and hence the
price q2
0 would be zero. Eﬀectively, the threat of punishment for default in period 2 when the
two-period loan is due does not induce the borrower to repay, because the borrower discounts
the future, so that reducing consumption in period 1 is worse than facing the punishment
for default in period 2. At the same time, the threat of punishment for default in period 1 is
irrelevant, because none of the debt is due in period 1, and the threat of punishment cannot
be used to induce savings.
4.1.2 One- and Two-Period Bonds
Now, if the borrower were able to issue one-period debt in period 0, consumption would be













Multiple possible portfolios allow this consumption pattern. The borrower could use
short-term debt to borrow against all period 1 income and long-term debt to borrow against
all period 2 income (b1
0 = y with q1
0 =1 ,b 2
0 = yH with q2
0 = g, b1
1 =0 ); or, the borrower could
use only short-term debt, issuing bonds in period 0 and period 1 (b1
0 = y +gyH with q1
0 =1 ,
b1
1 = yH with q1
1 = g). Since all consumption occurs in the ﬁrst period, utility in this case
is higher than in the case with long-term debt only. With one-period bonds, the threat of
punishment for default is being used in both periods to induce repayment.
In this example, long-term debt is illiquid in the sense that a loan that would provide the
same level of consumption in the ﬁr s tp e r i o dd o e sn o te x i s t ,b e c a u s et h ep r i c eo fl o n g - t e r m
debt falls to zero. This example illustrates that in the presence of lack of commitment in
debt policies and default risk, short-term debt is more liquid due to more lenient bond prices,
and thus it is a superior instrument to provide up-front resources.15
15It is easy to extend this example to an inﬁnite horizon environment with deterministic and time varying
output. A one-period bond economy can deliver higher initial consumption than a longer-term bond — two-
period or perpetuity — economy. The main idea is again that the threat of punishment can be used more
eﬀectively with one-period bonds because longer-term contracts might require savings in the future which
are impossible to induce with default punishments.
214.2 Example 2: Long-Term Debt Provides Insurance
For the second example, we focus on the motive for insurance by assuming that the borrower’s
preferences are given by
U = E[u(c0)+βu(c1)+β
2u(c2)]
with u(·) strictly concave and β =1 . We also now consider a diﬀerent income process.
Income in period 0 is equal to 0,i n c o m ei np e r i o d1i se q u a lt oy, a n di n c o m ei np e r i o d2
can take two values: yH or yL with yH >y L. The probability of yH i sl e a r n e di np e r i o d1
and can be either g or p with 0 <g<1 and 0 <p<1.
4.2.1 Only One-Period Bonds
First, consider the borrower’s choice under the assumption that only one-period bonds are












, the solution to the
borrower’s problem is the following. The borrower defaults in period 2 if income is yL
and does not default in all other states. Hence, cL
2 (p)=cL
2 (g)=ydef. Contingent on the
realization of the probability p or g, consumption is equalized between period 1 and the







Finally, consumption in period 0 is set to equalize expected marginal utility in period 1 to






0 (c1 (p)) + u
0 (c1 (g)))
Importantly, c1 (p) 6= c1 (g), so that consumption is not equalized across states within a
period. With only short-term debt available, the borrower borrows in period 0, then borrows
again in period 1. Debt issues are b1
0 = c0, b1
1 (p)=
yH+c0−y
1+p , and b1
1 (g)=
yH+c0−y
1+g . The price
of debt issued in period 1 depends on the state realized: q1
1 (p)=p and q1
1 (g)=g.T h e r e f o r e ,
as long as p 6= g, the price at which debt is rolled over in period 1 diﬀers across states, and
consumption diﬀe r sa sw e l l .
224.2.2 One- and Two-Period Bonds
Now, if the borrower has access to both one-and two-period bonds, it is possible to equalize
consumption across all states in which the borrower does not default:






2 yH + y
p+g
2 +2
The portfolio required involves using long-term and short-term debt in period 0, while bor-


























In this example the borrower faces risk because of the variation in bond prices across
states in period 1 due to diﬀerences in default risk in period 2. Using long-term debt in
period 0 allows the borrower to avoid the risk involved with rolling over short-term debt in
period 1. The borrower beneﬁts from this insurance with smoother consumption and higher
utility.





the borrower issues long-term debt. The lower discount price on long debt is the insurance
premium the borrower is willing to pay for insurance against the variation in bond prices
in period 1. This insurance mechanism is the same as that emphasized in Kreps (1982),
Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) in their models of the optimal maturity
structure of debt with incomplete markets. The diﬀerence in our model is that the variation
in bond prices comes from the government’s inability to commit to repaying, rather than
from variation in the lender’s marginal rate of substitution.
4.3 Summary
In a standard incomplete markets model with ﬂuctuating output and without default, a
borrower would ﬁnd the portfolio of long and short debt indeterminate if the risk-free rate
were constant across time; the two assets would have payoﬀst h a tm a k et h e me q u i v a l e n t .
However, in our model, the risk of default makes the two assets distinct. The ﬁrst example
illustrated that long-term debt is more illiquid than short-term debt due to the inability of
23t h eb o r r o w e rt oc o m m i tt of u t u r ed e b ta n dd e f a u l tp o l i c i e s . H o w e v e r ,t h es e c o n de x a m p l e
illustrated that long-term is beneﬁcial because it hedges against variations in short rates and
provides insurance for default risk.
Insurance and liquidity shape the optimal maturity structure of debt for a borrowing
government. The quantitative relevance of each of these forces depends on the speciﬁcs of
preferences and the income process. Thus, in the next section we quantify these two sources
by calibrating our general model to an actual emerging market economy.
5 Quantitative Analysis
5.1 Calibration
We solve the model numerically to evaluate its quantitative predictions regarding the dynamic
behavior of the optimal maturity composition of debt and the spread curve in emerging
markets. We calibrate an annual model to the Brazilian economy.
The utility function of the borrower is u(c)=
c1−σ
1 − σ
. The risk aversion coeﬃcient is set
to 2, which is a common value used in real business cycle studies. The risk-free interest rate
is set to 4.0% annually, which equals the average annual yield of a two year U.S. bond from
1996 to 2004. The stochastic process for output is assumed to be a log-normal AR(1) process
log(yt)=ρlog(yt−1)+ ε with E[ε2]=η2
y. Shocks are discretized into a seven-state Markov
chain using a quadrature-based procedure (Tauchen and Hussey 1991). We use annual series
of GDP growth for 1960—2004 taken from the World Development Indicators to calibrate the
volatility of output. Due to the short sample, rather than estimating the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient we choose an autocorrelation coeﬃcient for the output process of 0.9, which is in
line with standard estimates for developed countries. The decay parameters of the short and
long bonds, δS and δL, are set such that the default-free durations equal 2 and 10 years.
Following Arellano (2008) we assume that after default, output before reentering ﬁnancial
markets remains low and below some threshold, according to the following:
h(y)=
(
y if y ≤ (1 − λ)¯ y
(1 − λ)¯ y if y>(1 − λ)¯ y
,
where ¯ y is the mean level of output.
The output cost after default λ, the time preference parameter β, and the probability of
reentering ﬁnancial markets after default θ are calibrated jointly to match three moments in
Brazil: the average 2-year spread of 6%, the volatility of the 2-year spread of 5.3 and the




Discount factor lender r=4 % U.S. annual interest rate 4%
Risk aversion σ =2 Standard value
Perpetuity decay factors δS =0 .52 Default-free durations of 2 and 10 years
δL =0 .936
Stochastic structure ρ =0 .9,η=0 .022 Brazil output
Probability of reentry θ =0 .24 Mean 2-year spread of 6%
Output after default λ =0 .025 Volatility of 2-year spread of 5.3
Discount factor borrower β =0 .935 Average bond duration of 5.5 years
5.2 Results
We simulate the model, and in the following subsections we report statistics on the dynamic
behavior of spreads and the maturity composition of debt from the limiting distribution of
debt holdings. The model contains a dynamic portfolio problem where the borrower chooses
holdings of two defaultable bonds of shorter and longer duration. Below, we show how
movements in the probability of default generate time-varying diﬀerences in the prices, and
in the liquidity and insurance beneﬁts of these two assets, which rationalize the movements
in spread curves and maturity composition observed in the data.
5.2.1 Prices and Spreads
In the model all decision rules are functions of three state variables (bS,b L,y). However, for
the purpose of illustration, we consider a single artiﬁcial state variable, the wealth of the
economy: w = y − bS − bL. This variable is informative because it is highly correlated
with the true state variables: the correlations between wealth and income, short debt and
long debt equal 0.99, -0.56, 0.65 respectively. In what follows we analyze decision rules as
functions of wealth, constructed as scatter plots from the model simulation.
We ﬁrst analyze the default decision and spreads, and their relationship to wealth. Default
happens when the economy has a low level of wealth, as the left panel of Figure 3 indicates. In
the right panel of Figure 3, we see that, conditional on not defaulting, spreads are higher for
relatively lower levels of wealth. However in equilibrium, for very low wealth levels the spread
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Figure 3: Default decision (left panel) and spreads (right panel) as a function of wealth.
is not as high because the borrower actually prefers to default than borrow at excessively low
prices.
We now compare the model and data in terms of price and spread dynamics. The spread
and price series for the data are for 2- and 10-year bonds of Brazil from Section 2.16 For
this comparison, we organize the data into quantiles based on the level of the short spread.
Table 4 presents average spreads and prices for short and long debt across periods when short
spreads are below their 25th and 50th percentile and above their 50th and 75th percentile.
The model generates spread curve dynamics that match the Brazilian data well. The
ﬁrst two columns of Table 4 present the model’s short and long spreads, and the ﬁfth and
sixth columns present the data counterparts. In the model when default is unlikely, both
spreads are low, and the spread curve is upward-sloping: when the short spread is below its
25th percentile, for example, the average short spread is 1.04%, and the average long spread
is 3.83%. In contrast, when the probability of default is higher, both spreads rise, and the
spread curve becomes downward-sloping: when the short spread is above the 75th percentile,
16As explained in Section 2, spread curves for Brazil are estimated using equation (21) in the Appendix. In
the model for simplicity we are directly applying the yield to maturity formulas to compute spreads. However,
we could also estimate in the model spread curves using a reduced equation with only two parameters. Results
under this alternative estimate are similar, although the spread curves are slightly steeper.
26Table 4: Spread Curves
MODEL DATA









< 25 1.04 3.83 0.98 0.73 2.12 6.12 0.96 0.58
< 50 1.37 3.85 0.97 0.74 2.75 6.07 0.95 0.58
≥ 50 11.68 8.68 0.81 0.56 9.25 9.99 0.85 0.42
≥ 75 13.30 9.57 0.79 0.52 13.55 12.23 0.79 0.34
Overall Mean 6.58 6.25 0.89 0.65 6.01 8.04 0.90 0.50
Standard Deviation 5.53 3.39 0.08 0.15 5.85 3.39 0.08 0.13
the average short spread is 13.3%, and the average long spread is 9.57%. The fact that short
spreads rise more than long spreads is also reﬂected in the diﬀerence in the volatilities of the
two spread series: the standard deviation of the long spread is lower than that of the short
spread. Compared to the data for Brazil, the model captures the diﬀerence observed in the
slope of the spread curve associated with periods of high and low short spreads, as well as
the diﬀerence in volatilities of the two spreads. The model also matches quantitatively the
volatility of the long spread. The model’s overall average short and long spreads, however,
are both pinned down by the average probability of default, so the average spread curve is
quite ﬂat.
Underlying the time-varying spreads is the interaction of the dynamics of income and debt
with the price schedules for short and long debt. (Figure 6, in the Appendix, illustrates the
equilibrium price schedules for short debt ˆ qS(b0
S,b 0
L,y) and long debt ˆ qL(b0
S,b 0
L,y).) However,
the mapping from discount prices to spreads is not linear (eq. 1). Thus, to understand the
total default probabilities of each bond, it is informative to analyze price ratios deﬁned as
defaultable discount prices relative to default-free prices for a bond with duration m: qm/qm
rf.
The price ratio of each bond is the total repayment probability over the lifetime of the bond.
Table 4 presents statistics for these price ratios in the model and the data. The table shows
that contrary to spreads, price ratios for short-term debt are always higher than for long-term
debt both in the model and in the data. Moreover, price ratios are disproportionately lower
for short-term debt when short spreads are high both in the model and in the data.17
The distinct dynamics of price ratios and spreads can be understood as follows. Price ra-
tios reﬂect cumulative repayment (and default) probabilities, whereas spreads reﬂect average
default probabilities. Cumulative default risk for long-term debt is always larger than for
short-term debt both in the data and the model. However, annualized (average) default risk
17For Argentina, Mexico, and Russia price ratios for short-term debt are also always higher than for
long-term debt, and the diﬀerence is accentuated in times of high spreads.
27can be lower on long-term debt during times when the annual default probability in the short
run is larger than the annual default probability in the long run. Thus, contrary to common
belief in sovereign debt markets, the spread is not a comprehensive measure of the relative
cost of borrowing in diﬀerent maturities of debt. In particular, in times when the probability
of default is high, short-term debt may appear to be more expensive for the borrower than
long-term debt, in the sense that it has a higher spread, although long-term debt is worse in
the sense that it has a lower price, relative to the risk-free price. The connection between
the dynamic behavior of prices and spreads in our model is borne out in the data as well.
The preceding discussion also indicates that the important feature of our model for gener-
ating the observed dynamics of prices and the spread curve is that the probability of default
is mean-reverting: a period with high probability of default is followed by a period with lower
probability of default, and vice versa. The eﬀects of mean-reverting default probabilities on
the spread curve are the same as those highlighted by Merton (1974) in the case of credit
spreads for corporate debt. In our model the probability of default is endogenously mean-
reverting as a result of the dynamics of the output process and debt accumulation. When
output is high, it is also expected to be high in the near future, so the probability of default in
the next period is low. The economy borrows a large amount at low interest rate spreads, so
that in states where the economy is hit by a bad shock, default becomes more likely further in
the future. In contrast, when the likelihood of imminent default is high, the economy avoids
default in the next period only in states with high output. Conditional on not defaulting,
then, output is expected to remain high, and the probability of default further in the future
falls. The persistence and mean reversion of default and repayment probabilities driven by
the dynamics of debt and income therefore rationalize the dynamic behavior of the spread
curve observed in the data.
5.2.2 Maturity Composition
We now present the quantitative predictions for the maturity composition of debt. It is
important to note that we analyze the optimal maturity composition of debt in a framework
that generates the empirically observed dynamics of debt prices. As discussed in Section
4, two forces in the model shape the dynamic behavior of the maturity composition. First,
long-term bonds insure against future price ﬂuctuations; we ﬁnd that the insurance motive is
more valuable in times of high wealth. Second, short-term bonds are more liquid and allow
larger transfers of resources to the present with a smaller change in price; we ﬁnd that the
liquidity advantage for short debt is more valuable in times of low wealth. Given the negative
correlation between wealth and spreads, these two forces lead the borrower to use long-term
28debt more heavily in times when spreads are low and shift toward shorter term debt when
spreads are high.
Figure 4 plots the equilibrium choices of the perpetuity stocks b0
S and b0
L for diﬀerent
levels of wealth. The ﬁgure shows that in high wealth periods, the borrower chooses a large
position in long-term debt and a negative position (i.e., savings) in short-term debt. In low
wealth periods, the short-term position increases while the long-term position drops to zero.



















Figure 4: Short-term debt (left panel) and long-term debt (right panel) as a function of
wealth.
New issuances of short and long debt  S and  L are closely correlated with the perpetuity
stocks; thus, in high wealth states debt issuances are mostly long term and debt issuances
shift to shorter term in low wealth states. To compare issuances of long and short debt
between model and data, we now compute conditional averages of the duration of new debt
issuances, based on the level of the short spread. Average duration in the model is the sum
of the duration (equation 18) of each new bond issuance weighted by its share in total new
debt issued. Moreover, given that in the data we only have information on debt issuances
( S > 0 and  L > 0), in the model we compute average duration of the debt component of
the portfolio. Table 5 reports the average duration of new debt issuances when spreads are
above their median relative to when spreads are below their median in the model and in the
Brazilian data. Debt duration in the model mirrors the dynamics of duration in the bond
data of Brazil. In the model, average duration when spreads are low is longer and equals 5.30
years, whereas it shortens to 3.44 when spreads are high. In Brazil, the average duration
of bonds issued when spreads are high equals 6.03 years and shortens to 4.47 years when
29spreads are low.
Table 5: Average Duration of New Debt Issuances
MODEL DATA
sS pct
< 50 5.30 6.03
≥ 50 3.44 4.47
Overall 4.38 5.5
In Figure 5, we illustrate the trade-oﬀ between liquidity and insurance that determines
the decision of the debt portfolio. In the left panel of the ﬁgure, we show the liquidity
beneﬁts of short-term debt by plotting the increase in consumption that would be possible by
marginally increasing short-term debt, relative to the increase in consumption that is possible
by issuing more long-term debt. Speciﬁcally, deﬁne QB(b0
S,b 0





L,y) L as the quantity of consumption that is attained with a certain debt policy
b0
S,b 0
L, given the state (bS,b L,y).I nt h eﬁgure’s left panel, we plot the ratio of small deviations




QB(˜ bS(bS,b L,y)+εS,˜ bL(bS,b L,y),b S,b L,y) − QB(˜ bS(bS,b L,y),˜ bL(bS,b L,y),b S,b L,y)
QB(˜ bS(bS,b L,y),˜ bL(bS,b L,y)+εL,b S,b L,y) − QB(˜ bS(bS,b L,y),˜ bL(bS,b L,y),b S,b L,y)
where εS and εL are small, and are chosen so that if debt prices were always the default-
free prices, the ratio plotted would be exactly equal to 1. As the ﬁgure shows, this ratio in
our model is always above 1 and on average it equals 1.33. Thus, short-term debt is more
liquid because consumption can always be marginally increased more with short-term debt
than with long-term debt. The reason is that price schedules for short-term debt are more
lenient by having higher prices —lower default premia— that decrease by less as debt increases.
Looking across wealth levels, this diﬀerence is especially large in lower wealth states. Thus,
short-term debt is particularly useful for increasing consumption when wealth is low.
In our model, short- and long-term debt prices are actuarially fair for the lender. Thus, if
the schedules of short-term debt are more lenient, this means that the borrower will repay in
more future states. However, this does not mean that the borrower is indiﬀerent to acquiring
a certain level of resources with a small safer short-term loan, versus a large risky long-term
l o a n . I nf a c t ,w ek n o wt h a ti ft h eb o r r o w e rc h o o s e st od e f a u l ti ns o m ef u t u r es t a t e sw i t h
the long-term loan while choosing to repay in those same states with the short-term loan, he
30must be better oﬀ by repaying the short loan because he always have the option to default.
Moreover, default risk in our model limits the maximum level of resources that the borrower
can get.18 The key is that in our model these endogenous limits and price schedules are
tighter for long term debt relative to short term debt. The average ratio of borrowing in
each state to the short-term debt limit versus to the long-term debt limit equals 1.84. Thus,
the potential increase in consumption from exhausting short-term debt is 84% larger than
from exhausting long-term debt. Figure 5 also illustrates the tighter price schedules for long-
t e r md e b ta si n c r e a s e si ns h o r td e b tr e s u l ti nh i g h e rc o n s u m p t i o nb e c a u s eo fm o r el e n i e n t
prices. As discussed in the examples in Section 4, short-term debt can deliver larger absolute
consumption levels and larger consumption with smaller loans, because of the inability of
t h eb o r r o w e rt oc o m m i tt os a v i n gs u ﬃciently to repay long-term debt. Eﬀectively, the threat
of default punishment is more eﬀective to induce repayment of shorter-term debt because
repayment of short debt does not require future savings.
Although short-term debt is more liquid, long-term debt provides more insurance for price
ﬂuctuations that can lead to capital outﬂows in recessions. The right panel of Figure 5 plots
the correlation of the trade balance tb0 = y0 −e c(b0
S,b 0
L,y 0) and output y0 the following period
conditional on not defaulting for each wealth level today. The correlations are computed
using the borrower’s optimal consumption decision rules the following period. When wealth
is large and the portfolio is mostly long term, the correlation between the equilibrium trade
balance and output tomorrow is positive, i.e. capital outﬂows in booms and capital inﬂows
in recessions. However, when wealth is small and the portfolio is mostly short term, the
correlation is negative, i.e. larger capital outﬂows in recessions than in booms. The reason
why the model delivers capital outﬂows in recessions is that the price schedules for debt
are more stringent in recessions than in booms due to countercyclical default risk. The
correlation between output and the short spread in the model is −0.54. However, by issuing
long-term debt the borrower can avoid being forced to save in recessions due to excessively
adverse price schedules.
Table 6 provides more details about the maturity composition and the forces underlying
its determination. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 6 show the model’s portfolio, conditional
on diﬀerent levels of wealth. When wealth is high the borrower issues on average 50% of
his debt in long-term bonds, and 50% in short-term bonds. When wealth is low the average
maturity composition shifts to 39% in long-term bonds, and 61% in short-term bonds. As
illustrated above, the optimal portfolio depends on the valuations of the insurance beneﬁts
18Arellano (2008) shows that a one short-term asset version of our model generates an endogenous Laﬀer
Curve for borrowing which features a debt limit.
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Figure 5: Liquidity beneﬁt of short debt (left panel) and insurance beneﬁto fl o n gd e b t( r i g h t
panel)
of long debt relative to the liquidity and cost advantage of short debt. The table reports two
alternative metrics to evaluate these beneﬁts.
The insurance beneﬁts of long-term debt can be measured by the comovement between
the borrower’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, βu0(c0)/u0(c),a n dt h es h o r t - t e r m
bond price next period, qS0. As the table shows, this covariance is negative: in states with
high marginal utility of consumption, the short bond price is expected to be low. Issuing
long debt today allows the borrower to avoid having to issue short-term debt tomorrow in
states when prices are low. The insurance beneﬁt is stronger in high wealth periods, as this
covariation is −0.21 relative to −0.16.
To measure the cost advantage of short-term debt, we compute the slope of the price
ratios of the two debt classes:
qL(1+r−δL)
qS(1+r−δS). As the table shows, long-term debt is always more
costly in terms of carrying lower total repayment probabilities,
qL(1+r−δL)
qS(1+r−δS) < 1. Increasing
consumption using short-term debt is cheaper in that it contains lower default risk. And
short-term debt is disproportionately cheaper in low wealth times, as the slope of price ratios
is lower, 0.70 relative to 0.75. Thus, a larger share of short-term debt in low wealth times
can be understood as a reaction to the more expensive long-term debt.
Moreover, as in emerging markets data, periods of longer-term debt issuance correspond
to periods with lower spreads, and upward-sloping spread curves. Speciﬁcally, when wealth
is above its median, the average short spread equals 2.62%, and the long spread is on average
32Table 6: Model Maturity Composition






< 50 pct 0.61 0.39 10.84 -2.43 0.70 -0.16
≥ 50 pct 0.50 0.50 2.62 1.78 0.75 -0.21
1.78% above the short spread. On the other hand, when wealth is low, the short spread is
on average 10.84% and the long spread is on average 2.43% below the short spread.
In summary, through the lens of our model, the maturity structure of defaultable debt
in emerging markets and its covariation with spread curves and levels can be rationalized by
two factors: hedging advantage of long-term debt for insuring against ﬂuctuations in future
default risk, and a liquidity advantage of short-term debt for providing higher resources with
more lenient prices.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have developed a dynamic model to study the maturity composition of
sovereign bonds. In emerging markets data, changes in the maturity composition of debt
comove with changes in the term structure of spreads: when spreads on short-term debt
are low, long-term spreads are higher than short-term spreads, and the maturity of debt
issued is long. When short-term spreads rise, long-term spreads rise less, and the maturity
of debt shortens. Our model simultaneously reproduces the patterns observed in the term
structure of spreads and bond prices, and the maturity composition of debt. Changes in the
spread curve, which reﬂects the average default probability at diﬀe r e n tt i m eh o r i z o n s ,r e s u l t
from the output dynamics and the endogenous dynamics of debt. Issuing long-term debt
insures against future ﬂuctuations in short-term spreads that come from changes in default
risk. Short-term debt provides more liquidity because it allows the borrower to avoid the
more severe commitment problem in repaying long-term debt. With these two forces, the
model generates the pattern of issuances observed in the data. Long-term debt is issued
mostly in times of high wealth and low spreads, when the insurance motive is the strongest.
Short-term bonds are used more heavily in times when wealth is low and spreads are high,
because expectations of the borrower’s future debt and default choices restrict the availability
of long-term debt more heavily than of short-term debt.
Our main innovation has been to introduce multiple, long-term assets into a dynamic
33model with endogenous default. We view the resulting framework as useful for addressing a
variety of other questions for which it is important to analyze a trade-oﬀ in maturity choice
with defaultable debt. Natural applications are the maturity structure of consumer and
corporate debt. The literature on consumer bankruptcy thus far has focused on modeling
very short-term unsecured credit (Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007) and
Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007)). However, it would be interesting to analyze both long-
term and short-term defaultable loans, such as mortgages and credit card debts. In addition,
the mechanisms in our model are likely to be relevant in corporate debt given the similarity
between our facts on emerging market spread curves and the cross section of corporate debt
spread curves. Default risk has been shown to have important implications on ﬁrm’s dynamics
(Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Arellano, Bai, and Zhang (2007)). The model of this paper
can be used to further understand how the maturity choice can inﬂuence the entry, exit,
a n dg r o w t ho fﬁrms. Overall, our paper provides a tractable framework to study defaultable
debt of multiple maturities appropriate for these questions, and has highlighted the relevant
economic trade-oﬀs important for understanding maturity choice in the presence of default.
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37Appendix
Data Description
All the sovereign bond data are from Bloomberg. For the four countries we examine, we use
all bonds with prices quoted at some point between March 1996 and May 2004, with the
following exceptions. We exclude all bonds with ﬂoating-rate coupon payments, and at every
date, we exclude bonds that are less than three months to maturity, following Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Wright (2006). For each country, we estimate spreads starting from the ﬁrst week
for which at least four bond prices are available every week through the end of the sample.
We use data from 110 bonds for Argentina, 71 for Brazil, 63 for Mexico, and 25 for Russia.
To estimate default-free yield curves, we use data on U.S. and European government bond
yields. The U.S. data are from the Federal Reserve Board, and the European data are
from the European Central Bank.19 For constructing the quarterly maturity and duration
statistics, we also include bonds issued during the sample period that did not have prices
quoted, and use the estimated spread curve to construct their prices according to equation
(19).
Spread Curve Estimation
We use a method proposed by Svensson (1994), and used recently by Gurkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2006) for the United States, and Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2007) for a
sample of emerging markets, to ﬁt a spread curve to this data using a simple functional form
suggested by Nelson and Siegel (1987).
A coupon bond is priced as a collection of zero-coupon bonds, each with maturity given
by a coupon payment date, and face value given by the cash ﬂow on that payment date.
The price at date t of a bond issued by country i, paying an annual coupon rate c at dates













with the face value of the bond paid on the last coupon date.




t (n) is a default-free yield curve. We
19The U.S. data are the Treasury constant maturities yields, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm.
The European data are Euro area benchmark government bond yields, which is an average of European
national government bond yields available at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu.
38introduce another measure of a bond’s price, the y i e l dt om a t u r i t y , that is useful in estimating
spreads. For a bond with coupon c and payments in n1,n 2,...n J years, the yield to maturity










t(c,{nj}) given by (19). That is, the yield to maturity is the constant rate of interest
at which the bond’s price equals the discounted value of its payments.













































































for US ($)a n dE u r o( €) bonds.
As described by Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Diebold and Li (2006), the three components
of this curve correspond to a “long-term,” or “level” factor (the constant), a “short-term,”
or “slope” factor (the term multiplying β2) and a “medium-term,” or “curvature” factor (the
term multiplying β3). Linear combinations of these factors can capture a broad range of
shapes for the spread curve.




t by OLS, using U.S. and Euro bond yields.
Throughout, we follow Diebold and Li (2006) by setting the parameter λ =0 .714,s ot h a t
the term multiplying β3 in all countries’ spread curves is maximized when n =2 1
2 years.
Then, given a set of parameters β
i
t, we use equation (19) to price each of country i’s bonds
























t refers to r$
t if the bond is denominated in U.S. dollars, or r∗
t = r€
t if the bond is
denominated in a European currency. We use equation (20) to compute a yield-to-maturity
39for each bond, given the parameters β
i

















We estimate the parameters β
i
t nonlinearly by GLS to minimize the sum of squared
deviations of the predicted yields-to-maturity, y(c,{nj};β
i
t) from their actual values. That









where the summation is taken over all bonds issued by country i w i t hp r i c e sa v a i l a b l ea td a t e
t. As discussed in Svensson (1994), minimizing yield to maturity errors rather than price
errors gives a better ﬁt for short-term yields to maturity, because short-term bond prices are
less sensitive to their yields to maturity than long-term bond prices.
The following features present in the data require modiﬁcation of the basic bond pricing
equation (19):
1. Between coupon periods, the quoted price of a bond does not include accrued interest,
so we subtract from the bond price the portion of the next coupon’s value that is
attributed to accrued interest.
2. For bonds with principal payments guaranteed by U.S. Treasury securities, we discount
the payment of principal by the risk-free yield only, without the country spread.
3. For bonds with coupon payments that increase or decrease over time with certainty
(“step-up” and “step-down” bonds, respectively), we modify the sequence of payments
in equation (19) accordingly.
40Further Statistics on Spread Curves
Tables 7 reports further spread curves and spread volatilities for all countries.
Table 7: Average Spreads and Volatility
Maturity Overall Std. Dev When 2-year spread is above/below nth percentile
(years) (%) < 10th < 25th < 50th ≥ 50th ≥ 75th ≥ 90th
Argentina 2 5.23 7.92 1.11 1.63 2.16 8.30 12.64 23.41
5 6.03 4.46 2.50 3.08 3.76 8.30 11.06 17.02
10 7.02 4.15 3.45 4.10 4.95 9.08 11.49 16.48
15 7.43 4.24 3.82 4.49 5.41 9.44 11.78 16.58
Brazil 2 6.01 5.85 1.47 2.12 2.75 9.25 13.55 21.19
5 7.69 4.80 5.36 5.03 5.11 10.27 13.55 19.11
10 8.04 3.39 5.89 6.12 6.08 9.99 12.23 15.43
15 8.10 2.97 5.92 6.47 6.40 9.80 11.61 13.85
Mexico 2 1.87 1.37 0.31 0.57 0.95 2.78 3.51 4.85
5 2.87 1.10 1.81 2.01 2.27 3.47 4.01 5.24
10 3.81 1.05 2.55 2.86 3.30 4.33 4.76 5.72
15 4.19 1.09 2.81 3.18 3.70 4.68 5.07 5.91
Russia 2 5.04 3.45 1.66 2.00 2.69 7.37 9.56 12.22
5 5.57 3.18 2.51 2.66 3.30 7.82 10.13 12.34
10 5.45 2.59 2.33 2.56 3.46 7.43 8.90 10.30
15 5.37 2.44 2.20 2.48 3.50 7.22 8.29 9.35
41Model’s Debt Price Schedules
Figure 6: Price schedules for short- and long-term debt when income is at its mean
42